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FEDERALISM IN THE SECOND REPUBLIC'S
THIRD CENTURY
DANIEL WM. FESSLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
I admit with lingering doubt the proposition that the era of self-
affirmation has improved at least our perception of the human condition.
In such a climate praise, including that generated from within, is thick
on the ground. If I have an enduring objection it inheres in the difficulty
of issuing praise when it is genuinely due. This is one of those
occasions, a moment to pause and give thanks for Charles M. Haar, an
extraordinary educator and colleague. One could go on seeking to
identify this vibrant man but I cannot improve upon the self-character-
ization with which he began an extraordinary commencement address.
In June of 1994, as he stood before the faculty and graduating class of
the Hebrew College as they conferred the degree of Doctor of Human
Letters, Charles declared: "My own life has been the law." The address
evokes in this reader the same reaction that I have to Beethoven's
Seventh Symphony with its themes, challenges, and affirmation of hope.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. B.S.F.S., Georgetown University
1963; LL.B., Georgetown University 1966; SJ.D., Harvard University 1970. Professor
Fessler is in the sixth year of a six-year term as the President of the California Public
Utilities Commission.
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The comparitivism which he identifies is the fundamental similarity
uniting the underlying mind set and methods of the common law and
Jewish law.
Let me amplify how your general education at Hebrew College, and,
the implication of this sensitivity to legal thinking, are valuable:
You have mastered two cultures, and thus become comparativists.
Comparison, it can be argued, is the best way toward a deep
understanding of a subject. Fresh insights come from new
perspectives; stimulation comes from the surprise of assumptions
and conclusions arrived at in a manner inconsistent with the axioms
taken for granted.'
Though aimed at the young, his words have inspired one well into
middle age. They united with his admonition delivered a quarter of a
century ago over lunch at a coffee house just off of Harvard Square:
"From time to time try to match wits with big, meaningful problems."
Since this directive contained no subject matter limitations, I hope that
he will not take it amiss that I have strayed well beyond the
responsibilities and assignments of the intervening years to match a tiny
wit against the overarching issue of federalism and the role it ought to
play in what I will be terming the Second Republic's third century.2
The topic, federalism in the twenty-first century, embodies the
happy assumption that what I will be terming the "Second Republic"
survives until the end of this decade. This is a modest aspiration for a
set of ambitions, if not dreams, and institutions that are already 207.
From my perspective I am eager to share in the survival assumption for
it means that we shall encounter a recurrent set of challenges and
opportunities in a fundamentally unaltered constitutional framework.'
And it is in this context that I advance three propositions: (1) that the
absence of amendment has not in the past, and need not in the future,
stand as a barrier to startling redistribution of governmental powers;
(2) that many of the circumstances which can be identified as historical
precursors of such power shifts stalk current institutional arrangements
at both the state and national levels and underpin the vague feeling that
government just does not seem to work; and (3) that there is a new
1. Charles M. Harr, Address at the Hebrew University Commencement (June 1994).
2. The First Republic, under the Articles of Confederation, lasted only eleven years.
3. In making this statement I am aware of the current debate swirling around the
questions whither a balanced budget amendment and, if so, what is the appropriate content
for a proposition to be submitted to the several states.
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dimension to the debate which must be acknowledged if we are to profit
from the experience we have already launched.
If I may trade on the element of modest suspense, I will refrain
from identifying it for a little while. Sufficient for the moment is the
proposition that it arises from an unlikely comparativist source and, if
embraced, may provide a fresh perspective in our quest for the evolution
or creation of political institutions deployed at the level closest to our
problems and populace.
II. OUR REMARKABLY ADAPTABLE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT
My first proposition, that the constitutional framework of the Second
Republic has proven remarkably adaptable to the redistribution of power,
can best be defended by stepping back 209 years.4
On September 28, 1787, the Congress of the Confederation voted
to submit the draft of the new constitution to the several states for
ratification.5 Delaware became the first state to assent to the new
constitution and did so by unanimous vote at a convention called for that
purpose.6 The date was December 7, 1787. The relative speed and
unanimous support were inaccurate predictors of the reception of the
document at the level of the several states.
Five days after Delaware had acted in the affirmative the matter was
brought to a vote in Pennsylvania.7 Opposition forces focused upon the
4. A similar conclusion was advanced by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor speaking for
the majority in New York v. United States:
This framework has been sufficiently flexible over the past two centuries to allow
for enormous changes in the nature of government. The Federal Government
undertakes activities today that would have been unimaginable to the Framers in two
senses: first, because the Framers would not have conceived that any government
would conduct such activities; and second, because the Framers would not have
believed that the Federal Government, rather than the States, would assume such
responsibilities. Yet the powers conferred upon the Federal Government by the
Constitution were phrased in language broad enough to allow for the expansion of
the Federal Government's role.
505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992).
5. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 176 (1990).
6. Gaspare J. Saladino, Delaware: Independence and the Concept of a Commercial
Republic. in RATIFYING THE CONSTrrTION 29, 29 (Michael A. Gillespie & Michael
Lienesch eds., 1989).
7. George J. Graham, Jr., Pennsylvania: Representation and the Meaning of
Republicanism, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 52, 52.
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power of the central government and complained that the text of the
fundamental document was grossly deficient in defining the power of that
authority in relationship to that of the states. Notwithstanding,
ratification was secured by a vote of forty-six to twenty-three.9
Following overwhelming victories in New Jersey,'* Georgia," and
Connecticut, 2 the issue of the extent of the power of the central
government produced a razor thin assent in Massachusetts. The motion
to ratify passed by a majority of nineteen before a convention of 355."
This slim majority was secured only after an amendment was attached
which recommended that the constitution be augmented with an explicit
bill of rights to protect the states from federal encroachment on
individual liberties. 4 The year 1788 saw divided conventions produce
majorities for ratification in Maryland,' 5 South Carolina,16 and New
Hampshire. 17  In New Hampshire the convention passed a separate
motion calling for the addition of a bill of rights.'"
Under the terms of the draft which the Congress of the Confedera-
tion had submitted, ratification by nine states was sufficient to establish
a conforming federal government among the assenting states.' 9 The
assent of New Hampshire produced the decisive ninth vote. Yet no
attempt was made to organize the national government. The deterrent
8. Id. at 63-66.
9. Id. at 52, 66.
10. Sara M. Shumer, New Jersey: Properly and the Price of Republican Politics, in
RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 71, 71.
11. Edward J. Cashin, Georgia: Searching for Security, in RATIFYING THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 93, 93.
12. Donald S. Lutz, Connecticut: Achieving Consent and Assuring Control, in
RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 117, 117.
13. Michael A. Gillespie, Massachusetts: Creating Consensus, in RATIFYING THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 138, 158. The Constitution was ratified by a vote of 187
to 168. Id.
14. Id. at 151-58.
15. Peter S. Onuf, Maryland: The Small Republic in the New Nation, in RATIFYING
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 171, 171.
16. Robert M. Weir, South Carolina: Slavery and the Structure of the Union, in
RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 201, 201.
17. Jean Yarbrough, New Hampshire: Puritanism and the Moral Foundations of
America, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 235, 235.
18. Id. at 250-55.
19. Id. at 235.
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was realization that the two most powerful states-Virginia and New
York-had yet to agree.20 On June 10, 1788, Madison and Governor
Randolph overcame the forces of opposition, led by Patrick Henry and
George Mason, and obtained a ten vote majority in a convention of
168.2 The pro-ratification forces in Virginia had been greatly assisted
by the arguments of a little known delegate, John Marshall.22 But the
closest call was to come in New York where the motion before the
convention would have conditioned ratification on the prior adoption of
a bill of rights.' Again, the central focus of the debate was the issue
of state versus national authority. When that motion failed by a single
vote, a motion to ratify unconditionally passed with thirty voting in the
affirmative and twenty-seven casting a "no" ballot.25
On September 29, 1788, Congress passed a resolution placing the
new constitutional framework into operation. This was done notwith-
standing the fact that ratification conventions had yet to act in North
Carolina and Rhode Island. They were to add their assent in 1789 and
1790 respectively after George Washington had taken the oath of office
as President and the first bicameral national legislature had begun to
function. It is an interesting question to ponder the status of North
Carolina and Rhode Island in the period which elapsed between the
20. Michael A. Gillespie & Michael Lienesch, Introduction, in RATIFYING THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 1, 13.
21. Lance Banning, Virginia: Sectionalism and the General Good, in RATIFYING THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 261, 286.
22. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 5, at 179. Thirty-one years later John Marshall
was to recall those debates in the course of propounding a justification for the startling
proposition that only the United States Supreme Court could divine the appropriate
boundary between state and federal authority:
This government [of the Union] is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated
powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to it, would seem
too apparent to have required to be enforced by all those arguments which its
enlightened friends, while it was depending before the people, found it necessary to
urge. That principle is now universally admitted. But the question respecting the
extent of the powers actually granted, is perpetually arising, and will probably
continue to arise, as long as our system shall exist.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
23. Cecil L. Eubanks, New York: Federalism and the Political Economy of Union, in
RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 300, 325-28.
24. See generally id. at 304-34.
25. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 5, at 134-42, 241-42.
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demise of the First Republic and the establishment of the Second.26
That to which they had assented was gone and that to which they had not
agreed everywhere supplanted the confederation. Easing their angst, and
perhaps enticing their belated ratification, was knowledge that the debate
on the need for, and content of, a written assertion of the rights not
ceded to the national government, by 1789, fully engaged.
Every American who has completed a primary education has been
exposed to the basic history of the Bill of Rights. As I have noted, the
creation of such an enumeration had been called for by ratification
conventions in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. The popularity of
such an effort was also indicated by the votes taken in the New York
convention where ratification came within a single vote of being
conditioned upon such a step. Yet when the attempt was made it was
resisted. Surviving records of the first Congress seated under the new
Constitution reveal that James Madison was confronted with what he
characterized as ". . . one of the most plausible arguments I have ever
heard against the admission of a bill of rights. . . ." [in Madison's
words]:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would
disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration;
and it might follow by implication, that those rights which were not
singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the
General Government, and were consequently insecure.27
Madison's solution was embodied in the last clause of the fourth
resolution which he placed before his House colleagues: "The enumera-
tion in the Constitution, of certain rights shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people." The reader will recognize
26. Gillespie & Lieneseh, supra note 20, at 15-17. The situations of the two states
were quite different. North Carolina was represented in the Constitutional Convention
while Rhode Island was the only state which refused to send a delegation. The first effort
to ratify the Constitution in North Carolina failed in 1788. Michael Lienesch, North
Carolina: Preserving Rights, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 343, 343.
Ratification was achieved on the second try on November 21, 1789. Id. at 363-64. Rhode
Island refused to even consider ratification and it was not until May 29, 1790, that she
assented to it under the explicit threat of the new Congress that she was to be regarded as
a foreign nation and her trade goods subjected to import duties. Id. at 385. John P.
Kaminski, Rhode Island: Protecting State Interests, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 6, at 368, 368.
27. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
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the language of the Ninth Amendment.
Until quite recently the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court have been remarkably devoid of references to the Ninth Amend-
ment and the concept of rights reserved directly to the people. The
earliest citation can be credited to Justice Samuel Chase in Calder v.
Bull.28 The year was 1798. Calder is deserving of the closest reading
by students of republican thought and constitutional history. Decided
five years before the advent of Marshall's appointment, it is remarkable
for the tenor of the open debate on the restraints which are imposed upon
government by the terms of the post-revolutionary settlement. In
accordance with English legal practice, the opinions of the various
members of the Court were announced seriatim. The judgment of the
case was ascertained by simply counting the various votes for a specific
result. Chase voted to sustain the authority of the legislature of
Connecticut to change the process whereby probate rights were
adjudicated in the courts of that state and to subject a previously decided
will contest to revisitation under the altered regime. He used the
occasion to speculate at length upon the limited authority of the
legislative power at both the state and federal levels which he deemed to
be circumscribed by the terms of written constitutions and the norm of
the "social compact. 29
Fully anticipating the 1803 judgment in Marbury v. Madison,30
Chase announced that the hour had not yet come to decide "whether this
Court has jurisdiction to decide that any law made by Congress, contrary
28. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 387-88 (1798). Chase is remembered today as the only member
of the Supreme Court to ever be impeached by the House of Representatives. He was
born in Maryland in 1741 and educated privately. At the age of twenty he was called to
the Maryland bar. He was a member of the Maryland Assembly and in that capacity led
resistance to the Stamp Act. He was a member of the Continental Congress from 1774
to 1778 when such service was an act of treason against the British Crown. Chase
represented Maryland in the Congress of the Confederation for a two year period from
1784 to 1786. In 1796 he was nominated by President Washington to be an Associate
Justice of the United States Supreme Court. The event which triggered his impeachment
was criticism of the Jefferson Administration in the course of a charge delivered to a
federal grand jury. Chase was acquitted by the Senate and he continued to serve on the
Court until his death in June, 1811. SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, THE SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES 1789-1993, 41-45 (Clare Cushman ed.,
1993) [hereinafter SUPREME COURT JUSTICES].
29. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 387-89.
30. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Washington University Open Scholarship
102 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW
to the Constitution of the United States, is void."'" On the question of
whether the federal judiciary possessed a right to construe the constitu-
tions of the several states and to use that predicate to annul state
legislation, Chase was firmly resolved. "I am fully satisfied that this
court has no jurisdiction to determine that any law of any state
Legislature, contrary to the Constitution of such State, is void. ... I
should think that the courts of Connecticut are the proper tribunals to
decide whether the laws, contrary to the constitution thereof, are
void. 32
Notwithstanding this early focus, it is not until 1965 and the Court's
consideration of the constitutionality of a challenged anticontraceptive
statute that we find extensive citation to the Ninth Amendment in two of
31. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 392 (emphasis omitted).
32. Id. at 392-93 (emphasis omitted).
Justice James Iredell concurred in the view that the prohibition in Article I, § 10, against
state passage of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, was not offended by the revision
and retroactive application of non-criminal legislation. On the nature of the restraints
which acted upon governmental power in general, and legislative authority in particular,
he differed from Chase:
If then a government, composed of Legislative and Judicial departments, were
established, by a Constitution, which imposed no limits on the legislative power, the
consequence would inevitably be, that whatever the legislative power chose to enact,
would be lawfully enacted, and the judicial power, could never interpose to
pronounce it void. It is true that some speculative jurists have held, that a legislative
act against natural justice must, in itself, be void; but I cannot think that, under such
a government, any Court of Justice would possess a power to declare it so....
In order, therefore, to guard against so great an evil, it has been the policy of all
the American states, which have, individually, framed their state constitutions since
the revolution, and of the people of the United States, when they framed the Federal
Constitution, to define with precision the objects of the legislative power, and to
restrain its exercise within marked and settled boundaries. If any act of Congress,
or of the Legislature of a state, violates these constitutional provisions it is
unquestionably void, though, I admit, that as the authority to declare it void is of a
delicate and awful nature, the Court will never resort to that authority, but in a clear
and urgent case. If on the other hand, the Legislature of the Union, or the
Legislature of any member of the Union, shall pass a law, within the general scope
of their constitutional power, the Court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely
because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice. The
ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard; the ablest and purest men
have suffered upon the subject; and all that the Court could properly say, in such an
event, would be that the Legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had
passed an act which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the abstract
principles of natural justie ....
Id. at 398-99.
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the opinions rendered in Griswold v. Connecticut.33 Writing for the
majority, Justice William 0. Douglas pointed to the text of the Ninth
Amendment even as he appeared to rest his conclusion, that the statute
was fatally offensive to a protected right of marital privacy, on
"emanations" from the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. a4
Justice Arthur Goldberg, concurring, appeared to consider defending
the proposition that the language of the Ninth Amendment might stand
alone as a barrier between individual personal rights and the powers of
both the federal and state governments:
To hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted
in our society as the right of privacy in marriage may be infringed
because that right is not guaranteed in so many words by the first
eight amendments to the Constitution is to ignore the Ninth Amend-
ment and to give it no effect whatsoever.35
And yet he quickly retreated:
Nor do I mean to state that the Ninth Amendment constitutes an
independent source of rights protected from infringement by either
the States or the Federal Government. Rather, the Ninth Amend-
ment shows a belief of the Constitution's authors that fundamental
rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first eight
amendments and an intent that the list of rights included there not
be deemed exhaustive.36
The fact that the Court would have resorted to the Bill of Rights to
determine the constitutional validity of a state statute would almost
certainly have shocked a nineteenth century reader. The historical
context in which the first eight amendments were proposed, debated, and
ratified reveals that they were viewed as a check on the powers and
prerogatives of the national government. Justice Douglas was the chief
architect in a twenty-year campaign to find a wholesale incorporation of
those limitations on the authority of state government in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. At the time he spoke for the
majority in Griswold, his theory of wholesale incorporation did not
command the support of Justices Warren, Brennan, Goldberg, or Stewart.
33. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
34. Id. at 484.
35. Id. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg was joined in his
concurring opinion by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan.
36. Id. at 492.
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The debate which surrounded the ratification of the proposed second
constitution had, as we have seen, produced calls for an explicit bill of
rights in numerous state conventions. Unfortunately, insufficient
contemporary evidence survives to clarify the intent of many who gave
voice to this call. The terms of the Massachusetts resolution suggest an
emphasis upon protecting the status of the states, while the near
successful attempt to condition ratification in New York centered on
language more suggestive of an emphasis on individual rights. The final
provision of the Madisonian Bill of Rights addressed these issues:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.37
The debate in the House of Representatives outlined a dispute which
has erupted in each succeeding decade. Unfortunately for the respective
schools of political thought and interpretation, the intendment of the
"amending framers" must be deduced both from what they said and what
they declined to say. Those most jealous of preserving the powers and
prerogatives of state government made an unsuccessful bid to insert the
word "expressly" before the phrase "delegated to the United States."
The amendment was defeated in the House by a vote of seventeen to
thirty-two.3 8
Thirty years later, the debate flared in the judicial forum with the
written and oral submissions of the Attorney General of Maryland which
denied that the federal government possessed a power to create
corporations in the absence of explicit constitutional language reserving
or creating such authority. Students of the early court will instantly
recognize McCulloch v. Maryland.39 Chief Justice Marshall, who
37. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
38. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 767-68 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). We also know that the
motion was rejected in the Senate but no record of the vote survives.
39. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Although Justice Marshall elected to present the issue as one of first impression, it had
a prior history in the Supreme Court. In Calder v. Bull, Justice Chase was clearly mindful
of the Tenth Amendment, though he did not cite it in making the following observation:
It appears to me a self-evident proposition, that the several State Legislatures retain
all the powers of legislation, delegated to them by the State Constitutions; which are
not expressly taken away by the Constitution of the United States. The establishing
courts of justice, the appointment of Judges, and the making regulations for the
administration ofjustice, within each State, according to its laws, on all subjects not
entrusted to the Federal Government, appears to me to be the peculiar and exclusive
[Vol. 50:95
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played a vocal role in arguing for ratification of the Constitution in the
closely divided Virginia convention, set the stage with dramatic emphasis
on the character of the players as well as their roles:
In the case now to be determined, the defendant, a sovereign
State, denies the obligation of a law enacted by the legislature of
the Union, and the plaintiff, on his part, contests the validity of an
act which has been passed by the legislature of that State. The
constitution of our country, in its most interesting and vital parts,
is to be considered; the conflicting powers of the government of the
Union and of its members, as marked in that constitution, are to be
discussed; and an opinion given, which may essentially influence
the great operations of the government. No tribunal can approach
such a question without a deep sense of its importance, and of the
awful responsibility involved in its decision. But it must be decided
peacefully, or remain a source of hostile legislation, perhaps of
hostility of a still more serious nature; and if it is to be so decided,
by this tribunal alone can the decision be made. On the Supreme
Court of the United States has the constitution of our country
devolved this important duty.4"
In ultimately rejecting the submission of the State of Maryland,
Marshall advanced a concept of implied federal powers using as his foil
the "Necessary and Proper" Clause in the original text.4 To Marshall
it was dispositive that the framers of the amendment had consciously
province, and duty of the State Legislatures: All the powers delegated by the people
of the United States to the Federal Government are defined, and no constructive
powers can be exercised by it, and all the powers that remain in the State
Governments are indefinite; except only in the Constitution of Massachusetts.
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387 (1798).
40. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 400-01.
41. Id. at 419-21. The Chief Justice used as the justification for the assertion of
federal authority the very language from the Constitution which the Attorney General of
Maryland had relied upon to exclude that power. Marshall spent the great bulk of the
Court's opinion reacting to the following proposition:
But the argument on which most reliance is placed, is drawn from the peculiar
language of this clause. Congress is not empowered by it to make all laws, which
may have relation to the powers conferred on the government, but such only as may
be "necessary and proper'" for carrying them into execution. The word "necessary, "
is considered as controlling the whole sentence, and as limiting the right to pass laws
for the execution of the granted powers, to such as are indispensable, and without
which the power would be nugatory.
Id. at 413.
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refused to include the word "expressly" which, as he noted, had formed
the heart of the Articles of Confederation.42 This critical difference
between the formulations in the Articles and the Constitution sufficed to
extinguish claims of a textual answer and left future generations with a
context-specific controversy. It would be difficult to improve upon
Marshall's formulation of the enduring question: "whether the particular
power which may become the subject of contest has been delegated to
the one government, or prohibited to the other, to depend on a fair
construction of the whole instrument. 43
III. THREE AND ONE-HALF ERAS OF "FAIR CONSTRUCTION
OF THE WHOLE INSTRUMENT"
I believe that the decisions of the Supreme Court can be divided
into three eras. Let me offer a brief recapitulation of my reading of our
constitutional history as a prelude to my suggestion that we have clearly
entered a fourth.
A. The Marshall Court
Almost single handedly Chief Justice Marshall fashioned a series of
opinions which sought to enhance the authority of the national govern-
ment at the expense of the states.' This authority achieved its figura-
tive, if not literal, high water mark in Gibbons v. Ogden.45
It is a literal fact that the Chief Justice had barely been accorded a
dignified funeral before a majority of his surviving colleagues began a
42. Id. at 406-07.
43. Id. at 406.
44. Marshall's work to achieve this end commenced in Fletcher v. Peck, which held
a Georgia statute that annulled a conveyance of state land authorized by prior legislation
violative of Art. I, § 10, the impairment of contracts clause. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87 (1810).
Nine years later, McCulloch v. Maryland recognized "implied powers" in the national
government even as the Court limited the authority of states to tax federal
instrumentalities. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In that same year, Marshall authored
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, which upheld the inviolability of contracts
from amendment by states. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). Osborn v. Bank of the United
States repeated the Court's view that states were precluded from levying a tax on any
federal instrumentality. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
45. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Gibbons had been presaged by the cryptic remark
in Cohens v. Virginia, that "[i]n all commercial regulations, we are one and the same
people." 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 413 (1821).
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blistering counter-attack. In New York v. Miln,46 the Court announced
its judgment in a case heard before, but decided after, Marshall's
death. 7  Justice Barbour, writing for the majority, rejected the
contention that the Court distinguish Gibbons, on the premise that the
New York legislation did not directly affront an act of Congress:
But we do not place our opinion on this ground. We choose
rather to plant ourselves on what we consider impregnable posi-
tions. They are these: That a state has the same undeniable and
unlimited jurisdiction over all persons and things, within its
territorial limits, as any foreign nation; where that jurisdiction is not
surrendered or restrained by the constitution of the United States.
That, by virtue of this, it is not only the right, but the burden and
solemn duty of a state, to advance the safety, happiness and
prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general welfare, by
any and every act of legislation, which it may deem to be con-
ducive to these ends; where the power over the particular subject,
or the manner of its exercise is not surrendered or restrained, in the
manner just stated. That all those powers which relate to merely
municipal legislation, or what may, perhaps, more properly be
called internal police, are not thus surrendered or restrained; and
that, consequently, in relation to these, the authority of a state is
complete, unqualified, and exclusive.48
As forceful as this expression was, Barbour's role as an anti-
federalist Jacksonian Democrat was subordinate to that of Roger Taney.
Having served as Attorney General during Jackson's war on the National
Bank, Taney saw the Senate reject his initial nomination to the Court.49
His second chance, the nomination for the post vacated upon Marshall's
46. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
47. Marshall died in office on July 6, 1835. SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note
28, at 65. Andrew Jackson had been elected President in 1829. During his first term he
had made only one appointment to what was then a seven member Court, Henry Baldwin
of Pennsylvania. Id. at 108. On December 28, 1835, he nominated Roger B. Taney of
Maryland to succeed Marshall and Philip P. Barbour of Virginia as the successor to
Gabriel Duval. 5 CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD 1836-1864 33 (1974). Barbour served less than five years
during which time he was closely identified with Taney's strong support of state authority.
Id. at 55-58.
48. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 138. Justice Story dissented, noting that prior to his
death, Marshall had reached the conclusion that the New York statute was unconstitutional.
Id. at 160.
49. SWISHER, supra note 47, at 22-28.
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death, was decided by a Senate far more inclined to do business with a
re-elected Andrew Jackson.50 As Chief Justice, Taney's strong inclina-
tion to support states' rights received a full exposition in Proprietors of
Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge.5
B. Redressing the Balance: From Jackson to Hoover
The second era, which Barbour and Taney began in 1837, lasted a
century and was marked by a near uniform tendency to construe the
powers of the national government narrowly and thus, with or without
citation to the Tenth Amendment, to stress the limited nature and extent
of federal authority. A pro-State result was most likely if the specific
controversy involved an attempted application of federal authority to the
offices or officers of state or local government.
In Collector v. Day, the Court reflected, with what was probably
deliberate irony, on Marshall's famous aphorism in McCulloch that the
power to tax is the power to destroy.52 While broadly validating the
constitutionality of a national income tax, the Court found in the Tenth
Amendment a bar to a levy of such a tax upon the salaries of state
officers.5 3 The articulated reasoning came close to awarding foes of
federal power the victory they had narrowly been denied in the first
Congress and had failed to attain during the era of John Marshall. While
it did not construe the Amendment as requiring that federal authority be
grounded on express delegation, the Collector Court appears to have
achieved an equivalent reading: "[T]he States within the limits of their
powers not granted, or, in the language of the tenth amendment,
'reserved,' are as independent of the general government as that govern-
ment within its sphere is independent of the States."54 Perhaps even
more significant was the Court's decision a term earlier in United States
50. Id. at 33-37.
51. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 536 (1837). A blistering dissent by Justice Story lamented
the Court's retreat from the Marshall era and its use of the impairment of contract clause
as a federal restraint on state legislative authority. Id. at 582. For a useful exposition of
Taney's views on the Tenth Amendment as a subsequent expression of the will of the
people to limit the powers of the national govemment, see The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5
How.) 504, 573 (1847).
52. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870).
53. Id. at 124.
54. Id. Collector was expressly overruled by Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe,
306 U.S. 466, 468 (1939).
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v. Dewitt,55 which gave a very narrow reading to the commerce clause.
In the eyes of the Court the commerce clause added nothing to the
powers delegated to the national government:
[The] express grant of power to regulate commerce among the
States has always been understood as limited by its terms; and as
a virtual denial of any power to interfere with the internal trade and
business of the separate States; except, indeed, as a necessary and
proper means for carrying, into execution some other power
expressly granted or vested.
Two notable cases extended this view in contexts which ultimately
proved embarrassing for foes of federal authority. In 1883, the Court
examined the Civil Rights Act of 1875 and concluded that the attempted
criminalization of a denial of equal access to inns, theaters, and public
conveyances exceeded the authority of Congress and unconstitutionally
infringed on powers reserved to the States. 7 From the perspective of
the nation's inheritance of English laws and customs, few decisions could
have been so anti-historic. Indeed, securing access to inns and ferries
had been identified as a duty of the national sovereign since the time of
Henry de Bracton in the thirteenth century. 8 Notwithstanding, this
denial of federal authority continued to dominate well into the current
century being firmly repudiated only in 1965.' 9  In Hammer v.
Dagenhart,6 a five member majority found in the Tenth Amendment
a command to nullify a federal child labor law which sought to prohibit
the interstate transportation of goods produced by child labor.
Nor was the Court any more receptive to assertions of federal power
in the context of national economic regulatory schemes. A trilogy of
cases taken up in the Court's 1935 and 1936 Terms did not quarrel with
legislative objectives, but found that the means had invaded powers
reserved to the several states. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes,
55. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1869).
56. Id. at 44.
57. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
58. See generally CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL WM. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF
THE TRACKS 60-66 (1986) (discussing Bracton's theory of governance).
59. In the wake of United States v. Darby, Congress has managed to pursue federal
guarantees of equal access to public accommodations using the Commerce Clause. 312
U.S. 100 (1941). See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(declaring the Civil Rights Act of 1964 a valid exercise of Congress' power).
60. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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writing for a five member majority in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States,6' summarized this second era even as he unmasked the
force which was to overthrow it. His major premise was simple:
National economic emergency conditions did not justify the national
legislative and executive branches' assumption of "extraconstitutional
authority." 62  A year later in United States v. Butler,6' a six Justice
majority declared unconstitutional a federal tax on the processing of
agricultural products, the proceeds of which were used to support farmers
who complied with federal production quotas. 64  During that same
Term, the Court in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,6 invalidated an attempt
by Congress to levy a federal excise tax on coal produced by
nonmembers of a working agreement known as the "Bituminous Coal
Code" which was established as part of a federal regulatory scheme. 6
C. From Dual Sovereign to Mere Truism
Few contemporary observers predicted that, within a single year, the
Court would turn 180 degrees and conclude that the power of Congress
over interstate commerce is complete in itself finding no limitations on
Congress' power other than those articulated in the Constitution. Justice
Owen Roberts, who had voted with the Court's unreconstructed foes of
expanded national authority, abandoned their cause as well as their
company6l to join an apparently converted Chief Justice Hughes in
forming a majority sustaining the validity of the National Labor RelationAct. The shifting attitudes and personnel soon focused on the issue of
61. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
62. Id. at 528-29.
63. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
64. Id.
65. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
66. Id. at 278-79.
67. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). It is important to note
that the history of Justice Roberts and the "Four Horsemen" is not necessarily a happy one
from the perspective of those who favor state authority. Indeed, in the period in which
they made war on the economic programs and ambitions of the New Deal, this majority
also rejected numerous state statutes which aimed to improve conditions in the work place.
As recently as the prior term they had decided Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298
U.S. 587 (1936), striking down a minimum wage law for women. Here, too, Roberts'
sudden conversion was decisive. In 1937 he joined the dissenters in Morehead to form
a majority which sustained a broader state minimum wage statute in West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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federalism. In 1941, Justice Harlan F. Stone spoke for the Court in
United States v. Darby." The occasion was the revisitation of the
Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and the authority of the
national government with respect to fair labor standards. Not only was
Hammer v. Dagenhart expressly overruled, 9 but the Tenth Amendment
was reduced to the status of "a truism that all is retained which has not
been surrendered."7 The third era crested with Stone's assertion for a
unanimous Court.
D. A Truism Revisited in a Period of Political Discontent
Thirty-five years is a modest moment in the history we have just re-
viewed. And it was for that period that the "truism" slept until the
advent of its "Bicentennial Moment." In National League of Cities v.
Usery,7" Justice William Rehnquist spoke for a bare majority in
language which dramatically revivified the debate. At issue was the
constitutionality of subjecting state government, in its capacity as an
employer, to the minimum wage and maximum hour requirements as set
forth in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).72 For those anticipating
a routine affirmance of national power, the storm warning was raised
early in the opinion: "This Court has never doubted that there are limits
upon the power of Congress to override state sovereignty, even when
exercising its otherwise plenary powers to tax or to regulate commerce
which are conferred by Art. I of the Constitution. 73 In Fry v. United
States,74 the Court recognized that an express declaration of this
limitation is found in the Tenth Amendment:
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a
"truism," stating merely that "all is retained which has not been
surrendered," . . . it is not without significance. The Amendment
expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not
exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their
68. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Justice Stone was promoted to the post of Chief Justice by
Franklin Roosevelt soon after this decision was handed down.
69. Id. at 116-17.
70. Id. at 124.
71. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
72. Id. at 835-37.
73. Id. at 842.
74. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
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ability to function effectively in a federal system.7"
Having warmed to his subject, Justice Rehnquist returned to the
theme which had marked the second era, the concept of dual sovereignty
and the inviolate nature of essential state and local functions:
The question we must resolve here, then, is whether these determi-
nations [fixing the terms and conditions of state employment] are
"functions essential to separate and independent existence,". . . so
that Congress may not abrogate the States' otherwise plenary
authority to make them.76
As the Court noted,
It is one thing to recognize the authority of Congress to enact laws
regulating individual businesses necessarily subject to the dual
sovereignty of the government of the Nation and of the State in
which they reside. It is quite another to uphold a similar exercise
of congressional authority directed, not to private citizens, but to the
States as States. We have repeatedly recognized that there are
attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which
may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack
an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but
because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority
in that manner.77
The National League of Cities Court then proceeded to expressly
overrule a 1968 precedent, Maryland v. Wirtz, which had found no
constitutional inhibition to the power of Congress to subject state schools
and hospitals to the FLSA.78
So startling was the ruling in National League of Cities that many
missed the fact that the critical fifth vote, that of Justice Harry
Blackmun, was accompanied by a brief concurring opinion which
betrayed a troubled mind.79 By 1982, Blackmun's disenchantment with
75. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 842-43 (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 845-46 (quoting Coile v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911)).
77. Id. at 845.
78. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
79. Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The dimension of the National League of
Cities's majority's departure from what had become the "conventional wisdom" can best
be understood by noting several third era opinions. In Case v. Bowles, a six member
majority concluded that "the Tenth Amendment '[did] not operate as a limitation upon the
powers, express or implied, delegated to the national government."' 327 U.S. 92, 102
(1946) (quoting Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 362 (1945); United States v. Darby,
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National League of Cities was strongly suggested in his opinion for a
divided Court in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v.
Mississippi.80 At issue was the constitutionality of critical provisions
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA)., The
announced goal of the federal legislation was to promote energy
conservation and to encourage the development of non-utility generation
in the form of cogeneration and small power production facilities.8 2 To
achieve this objective, Congress directed the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) to exempt such "qualifying facilities" from certain
state regulations.83  The truly unique feature, however, was the
requirement that FERC promulgate rules requiring utilities to purchase
power from these facilities." State commissions were then obligated
to enforce the FERC policies by issuing conforming regulations of their
own and serving as a forum for the resolution of disputes between utility
purchasers and non-utility generators."s The energy conservation goals
were to be advanced in a substantively less intrusive manner. The Act
obliged state ratemaking agencies to follow specific procedures for the
consideration of such innovations as time-of-day, seasonal, and
interruptible rates.' Thus, while the state was not obligated to adopt
such policies, its procedures were conscripted as part of an agenda
dictated by the federal government.
The State of Mississippi reacted with considerable vigor. It initiated
a suit in the local federal district court against both the FERC and the
Secretary of Energy, seeking a declaration that the features of Policies
Act of 1978 were unconstitutional as beyond the scope of congressional
312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)). One year later, the Court concluded that the Tenth
Amendment did not deprive the national government of authority to resort to all means
"appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end." Oklahoma v. United States Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947). The Court surely reached a low point when
Chief Justice Earl Warren repeated, for a unanimous Court in Sperry v. Florida, the
observation that the Tenth Amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which has
not been surrendered." 373 U.S. 379, 403 (1963).
80. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
81. Id. at 745.
82. Id. at 750.
83. Id. at 751.
84. Id.
85. FERC, 456 U.S. at 75 1.
86. Id. at 746-47.
Washington University Open Scholarship
114 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW
power under the Commerce Clause and as an affront to state sovereignty
in violation of the Tenth Amendment. 7 The district court ruled in
favor of the state, placing its Tenth Amendment reliance squarely on
National League of Cities.8
Blackmun's majority opinion reversed the district court and
dismissed the state's petition for relief 9 In the eyes of the majority,
it was of great consequence that the Act did not require state adoption
of energy conservation goals and standards, but merely their
consideration of such a step.' Further, the majority was of the view
that the Commerce Clause provided ample authority for Congress to
entirely occupy the field of regulation of investor owned utilities. 9'
Thus, to the degree that the challenged legislation obliged the state
commissions to perform certain functions and attom to specific federal
standards, Congress was indulging a lesser included power. 92
Two years later, National League of Cities was dead, specifically
overruled in a second five to four Blackmun decision announced in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.93 I will return
to the majority's rationale for abandoning National League of Cities as
an experiment in constitutionalism which had proven unworkable in a
moment. Justice Powell spoke for what we may term the "National
League of Cities four," concluding that the majority had repudiated
Marbury v. Madison and left the states to the mercy of what he termed
"federal political officials."'94 Justice Rehnquist, writing separately,
87. Id. at 752.
88. Id. at 753.
89. Id. at 745.
90. FERC, 456 U.S. at 764.
91. Id.
92. Indeed, the majority saw in this Congressional strategy evidence of the
"cooperative federalism" recognized in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). Justice O'Connor, in a dissentjoined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist, concluded that the attempt by Congress to set an agenda for state
utilities commissions defied the nation's constitutional history. FERC, 456 U.S. at 775.
Justice Lewis Powell, the other member of the National League of Cities majority
abandoned by Blackmun, wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 771.
The vitality of FERC v. Mississippi may be in question given the views of the six
member majority marshalled by Justice O'Connor in New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992).
93. 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
94. Id. at 567 (Powell, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 50:95
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol50/iss1/4
1996] FEDERALISM IN THE SECOND REPUBLIC'S THIRD CENTURY 115
defiantly declared: "I do not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent
to spell out further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident,
in time again command the support of a majority of this Court."95
Somewhat more restrained was Justice O'Connor's assertion that: "With
the abandonment of National League of Cities, all that stands between
the remaining essentials of state sovereignty and Congress is the latter's
underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint."'
Lest I conclude this section on a misleading note, I hasten to add
that Garcia was not the exquisite last word on the subject of state versus
federal relations. In 1991 and 1992, Chief Justice Rehnquist's prediction
that time was on the side of those determined to revisit Blackmun's
opinion appears to have come true. Justice O'Connor, emerging as one
of the most thoughtful, resourceful, and persistent defenders of state and
local government, put together back to back majorities in Gregory v.
Ashcroft7 and New York v. United States.9" Each case represents a
vindication of federalism, although neither contained a bid to explicitly
overrule Garcia.
Since Garcia retains some apparent vitality, I have reread it in quest
of greater understanding. I have concluded that the key to the decision
lies in National League of Cities, the case it overruled. In 1985, Justice
Blackmun's switch reversed the Court's nine year experiment, begun in
National League of Cities and refined in Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,99 to identify the essential functions of
state and local government as defining Tenth Amendment limitations on
95. Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
97. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). The majority consisted of Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and newly appointed Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter.
98. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). The majority had grown to six with the addition of
Associate Justice Clarence Thomas. At issue in this case were three provisions of the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 which required that a state
which refused to meet congressionally set deadlines for disposing of such waste products
take title to the waste from the generators and incur any consequential damages suffered
by those generators. Id. at 149-54. The majority held these provisions unconstitutional
concluding that "[w]hether one views the take title provision as lying outside Congress'
enumerated powers, or as infringing upon the core of state sovereignty reserved by the
Tenth Amendment, the provision is inconsistent with the federal structure of our
Government established by the Constitution." Id. at 177. Justices White, Blackmun and
Stevens, all that remained of the "Garcia five," dissented with respect to the determination
of unconstitutionality.
99. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
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the scope of Congressional authority. The genius of National League of
Cities was to be found in its departure from an inquiry into whether
national authority might be recognized and its admission that, even in
circumstances in which that authority was to be conceded, the Tenth
Amendment posed a barrier to its exercise with respect to the core instru-
mentalities and personnel of state and local government.
This innovation, which may in truth have been a revival of the
nineteenth century line of cases beginning with Collector v. Day,'
was the source of a fatal pragmatic defect. In the view of the five to
four majority in Garcia, the inability of the federal judiciary to devise an
adequate test for distinguishing those essential attributes of sub-national
sovereignty constituted a persuasive reason to abandon the effort.
However, the Court identified a dysfunctional approach to federalism as
the compelling reason to overrule National League of Cities:
The problem is that neither the governmental/proprietary distinction
nor any other that purports to separate out important governmental
functions can be faithful to the role of federalism in a democratic
society. The essence of our federal system is that within the realm
of authority left open to them under the Constitution, the States
must be equally free to engage in any activity that their citizens
choose for the common weal, no matter how unorthodox or
unnecessary anyone else-including the judiciary--deems state
involvement to be. Any rule of state immunity that looks to the
"traditional," "integral," or "necessary" nature of governmental
functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make
decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it
dislikes....
We therefore ... reject, as unsound in principle and unwork-
able in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation
that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmen-
tal function is "integral" or "traditional." Any such rule leads to
inconsistent results at the same time that it disserves principles of
democratic self-governance, and it breeds inconsistency precisely
because it is divorced from those principles. If there are to be
limits on the Federal Government's power to interfere with state
functions-as undoubtedly there are-we must look elsewhere to
find them.''
100. 78 U.S. (I Wall.) 113 (1870).
101. Gracia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 545-47 (1985). Ten
years later, Justice Kennedy seemed to view the matter as unimproved. In his concurring
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I agree, and in closing would like to suggest that alternative focus as
well as some pragmatic steps to deploy such a strategy.
IV. SUBSIDIARITY: THE KEY TO THIRD CENTURY FEDERALISM
A. Origin and Meaning of the Concept
In 1994, Professor George Bermann wrote a provocative piece,
entitled Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, which examined federalism in the
European Union as well as the United States. °2  Noting that
subsidiarity "has dominated discussions of European federalism for over
five years,' 'o3 the author informs us that "the drafters of the Maastricht
Treaty on European Union ... chose to make the principle a central
tenet of the Community's latest constitutional reform., '""4 There
followed an excellent discussion of this concept, its moral and pragmatic
implications, and its historical role in political thought. Only later does
the author turn to the topic in the context of American federalism. Let
me assert his major conclusion in Professor Bermann's own words:
It is reasonable to suppose, given subsidiarity's evident conceptual
and operational difficulties, that those architects [of the emerging
European Union] might also have inquired into the role, if any, that
the notion of subsidiarity plays in the workings of U.S. federalism
and into its efficacy in that setting. I conclude, however, that not
only would the Europeans not have found subsidiarity in the lexicon
of U.S. constitutional law, but they would not have found it to be
a central feature of U.S. constitutional practice. In other words, the
opinion in United States v. Lopez, he noted:
Of the various structural elements in the Constitution, separation of powers, checks
and balances, judicial review, and federalism, only concerning the last does there
seem to be much uncertainty respecting the existence, and the content, of standards
that allow the judiciary to play a significant role in maintaining the design
contemplated by the Framers. Although the resolution of specific cases has proved
difficult, we have derived from the Constitution workable standards to assist in
preserving separation of powers and checks and balances.... These standards are
by now well accepted. Judicial review is also established beyond question... . Our
role in preserving the federal balance seems more tenuous.
115 S. Ct. 1624, 1637-38 (1995) (citations omitted).
102. George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the
European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 331 (1994).
103. Id. at 332.
104. Id. at 333-34.
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U.S. system offers few political or legal guarantees that the federal
government will act only when persuaded that the states cannot or
will not do so on their own." 5
With great deference to a scholar of obviously prodigious talent, I
respectfully disagree. In my view, subsidiarity in both its classical
concept and modem formulation is decidedly congruent with American
political thought running the gamit: from those who participated in the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and
her colleagues in the majority in New York v. United States in 1992.
Further, conscious deployment of this principle at both the legislative and
judicial level is the superior strategy Justice Blackmun longed for in
Garcia. To accomplish this objective in the course of concluding this
Article requires that I borrow further from the contribution of Professor
Bermann.
Bermarm informs his reader that advocates of subsidiarity in the
European Community trace the concept to twentieth-century Catholic
social philosophy, citing a 1931 Papal Encyclical of Pius XI entitled
Quadragesimo anno. According to that document, subsidiarity requires
that "[s]maller social units ... not be deprived of the possibility and the
means for realizing that of which they are capable [and] [ljarger units
... restrict their activities to spheres which surpass the powers and
abilities of the smaller units."'0 6
This encyclical, aimed at the growing centralization of statist power
in Europe, was ridiculed in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Today this
explicit "preference for governance at the most local level consistent with
achieving government's stated purposes" is a central feature of the
German Constitution (Grundgesetz or Basic Law).0 7 Article 72(2)
provides that in areas of shared competence the federal government may
legislate only if necessary, that is, if the states cannot effectively achieve
the goals sought.'08
105. Id. at 403.
106. Id. at 339 (citations omitted) (quoting Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, The Principle of
Subsidiarity Viewed by the Sociology of Organizations, 48 THE JURIST 275, 280 (1988)).
107. Bermann, supra note 102, at 339.
108. Article 72(2) provides:
The Federation shall have the right to legislate on [matters within the concurrent
legislative powers of the Federation and the Lander (states)] to the extent that
a need for regulation by federal law exists because:
1. a matter cannot be effectively regulated by the legislation of individual
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Bermann next turns his attention to convincing the reader that
subsidiarity matters because it draws "connections between local
governance and certain more fundamental values."'" ° Those values are
identified as: (1) self-determination and accountability, (2) political
liberty, (3) flexibility, (4) preservation of identities, (5) diversity, and (6)
respect for internal divisions of component states."' I ask that you
keep both this definition and those values in mind as we recall key
aspects of the American constitutional history we have just reviewed.
B. Subsidiarity in Our Constitutional Context
I have concluded that while the term is not used, there is clear
evidence that the concept of subsidiarity was alive and well and reflected
the conscious choice of a majority of those who framed the Constitution.
On May 28, 1787, the Convention which met to amend the Articles of
Confederation voted on the Sixth Resolution, which sought to re-define
national authority. Here is the text of their resolve:
That the national legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy
the legislative rights vested in Congress by the confederation; and
moreover
To legislate in all cases, . . . to which the separate States are
incompetent.., or in which the harmony of the united States may
be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation."'
I am struck by the remarkable congruence between this resolve and the
encyclical letter of Pius XI. Consider the defense of federalism advanced
by Justice O'Connor in Gregory v. Ashcroft:
This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the
people numerous advantages. It assures a decentralized government
that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogenous
society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in
Lander, or
2. the regulation of a matter by a Land law might prejudice the interests
of other Lander or of the entire community, or
3. the maintenance of legal or economic unity, especially the maintenance
of uniformity of living conditions beyond the territory of a Land
necessitates such regulation.
Id. at 338 n.17.
109. Id. at 339.
110. Id. at 339-42.
111. 1 REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 47 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
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democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and experimen-
tation in government; and it makes government more responsive by
putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.
In the tension between federal and state power lies the promise of
liberty.'" 2
C. Subsidiarity in Practice
If I am correct in my belief that there is a mirrored image between
the concept of subsidiarity and the vision of American federalism, it
would appear that we lack only the recognition of the term as a predicate
for devising tools to more effectively deploy the principle in the
revitalization of the Republic on the threshold of its third century. May
I conclude with two pragmatic strategies: the first aimed at the field of
legislation, the second at the exercise of adjudication.
How might the Congress go about implementing a commitment to
subsidiarity? To borrow from an in-progress experiment with democracy,
it could begin by framing a "Contract for a Federalist Future." The
essence of the bargain would be the requirement that, before there is any
enactment of substantive legislation which invades the traditional police
powers of the several states, there be both factual inquiry and policy
hearings designed to determine the presence of a national interest which
lies beyond the competence or willingness of state or local
government." 3
At the judicial level, the Court need not repudiate Marshall's
proposition that the national legislature enjoys implied as well as
explicitly delegated powers, but it could require as part of its "rational
basis" test evidence of Congressional fact finding and policy determina-
tions consistent with the principle of subsidiarity. In the absence of such
a record, the Court could remand the matter to the Congress for such
112. 501 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991). See also New York v. United States:
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the
States or state governments as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit of the
public officials governing the States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides
authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals.
505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).
113. Thoughtful commentators have not despaired that like concerns are within the
grasp of democratically elected representatives. See Paul Brest, The Conscientious
Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975); Stephen
F. Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 MINN. L. REv. 311 (1987).
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explicit and visible political determinations."' In this manner we can
test the conviction of James Madison and Harry Blackmun that fully
alerted citizens will exert political pressure in defense of federalism.
Failing such a demonstration, the Court could resolve the ambiguity
against the expansion of federal legislative or administrative regulation
into local affairs.'' 5
The issue before the Court in Finley v. United States"6 arose from
tragic circumstances. Petitioner's husband and two of her children lost
114. In its most recently concluded term the Court had occasion to visit the notion that
Congress might be required to make explicit findings with respect to federalism issues.
In United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), a five member majority concluded that
the Commerce Clause did not extend the authority of the national government to a local
school yard. At issue was the constitutionality of the Free School Zones Act of 1990
which made it a federal offense to possess a firearm in a school zone. Id. at 1626. Chief
Justice Rehnquist surveyed the history of judicial interpretation of the Commerce Clause
and concluded that it supported the authority of Congress to regulate in three broad
categories: (I) the use of channels of interstate commerce; (2) the intrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3) those activities
having a substantial relationship to interstate commerce. Id. at 1629-30. In the eyes of
the majority the first two grounds were not even facially implicated in an attempt by
Congress to regulate the possession of a firearm on local school premises. Id. at 1630.
Thus, if the legislation were to be sustained, it would have to be on the premise that
possession of such a weapon bore a substantial relationship to interstate commerce. In this
context, Rehnquist had occasion to speak to the utility of Congressional findings and the
problems inherent in their absence:
Although as part of our independent evaluation of constitutionality under the
Commerce Clause we of course consider legislative findings, and indeed even
congressional committee findings, regarding [the] effect on interstate commerce ....
the Government concedes that "[n]either the statute nor its legislative history
contain[s] express congressional findings regarding the effects upon interstate
commerce of gun possession in a school zone." We agree with the Government that
Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial
burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce. But to the extent that
congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the
activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such
substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here.
Id. at 1631-32 (citations omitted).
115. Given their position on the need for a substantial restraint as a sensible
prerequisite for invoking the Sherman Act, as articulated in their dissent in Summit Health
Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322 (1991), such a rule of statutory interpretation might well
appeal to Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter.
There are other recent Court decisions upon which such a limited judicial role might be
crafted. See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989) (reflecting a rather strict
enforcement of the limited nature of explicitly delegated subject-matter jurisdiction).
116. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
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their lives when a private plane in which they were passengers became
ensnared in electric transmission lines on its approach to the San Diego
airport." 7 Mrs. Finley initially brought a tort action in California state
court. Later she learned that the Federal Aviation Authority was
responsible for the maintenance of the runway lights whose faulty
condition may well have contributed to the disaster.' She then
commenced an action against the United States in federal district court
using as her predicate the Federal Tort Claims Act." 9 Approximately
one year later, she moved to amend the federal complaint to add the
local utility and the city of San Diego as defendants in the state court
action. It was admitted that there was no independent basis for the
assertion federal jurisdiction over these pendant parties. The district
court granted the motion, only to have its judgment summarily reversed
by the court of appeals. 2 °
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the majority, speaking through
Justice Scalia, affirmed the court of appeals.' The majority expressed
the view that it was upholding settled law and rejected an invitation to
change it: "Our cases show ... that with respect to the addition of
parties, as opposed to the addition of only claims, we will not assume
that the full constitutional power has been congressionally authorized,
and will not read jurisdictional statutes broadly."' 2 In elaborating on
the policy choice which animated the decision, Scalia left no doubt as to
the Court's concern with issues of federalism, citing a 1934 precedent for
the proposition that: "Due regard for the rightful independence of state
governments ... requires that [federal courts] scrupulously confine their
own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined.' 23
117. Id. at 546.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 546-47.
121. Finley, 490 U.S. at 556.
122. Id. at 549.
123. Id. at 552-53 (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934)). Even more
useful is Justice O'Connor's 1991 opinion for the Court in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452 (1991). Her majority opinion concluded that the federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act should not be interpreted to prohibit Missouri's practice of mandatory
retirement for its judicial personnel at age 70. Id. at 473. Of greatest interest was her tool
for reaching this conclusion-a forceful reiteration of the rule of construction that an
invasion by Congress of the "usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers" will
never be presumed but must arise from the plainest possible statement of that intent, Id.
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Taking the simple step of federal judicial restraint in local affairs would
move subsidiarity from an instinct for federalism into an operational
concept of governance in the Republic's third century. It would restore
the vision of the framers of the Second Republic that the national
government, as an entity of limited delegated power, was "to legislate in
all cases ... to which the seperate States are incompetent, or in which
the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of
individual Legislation.' 24
at 460. The Gregory Court then cited Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 65 (1989), for a collection of authorities in support of the proposition that: "[l]f
Congress intends to alter the 'usual constitutional balance between the States and the
Federal Government,' it must make its intention to do so 'unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute."' 501 U.S. at 460 (citation omitted).
124. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 21 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
This amended version of the Sixth Resolution of the Constitutional Convention was
adopted in May, 1787, and reported to the Committee of Detail which then drafted the
Constitution upon the explicit premise that it reflect the Resolutions passed by the
Convention. On August 16, the Convention, in turn, adopted the Committee's recommen-
dation setting forth the enumerated powers of the "Legislature of the United States."
Among those provisions was the recommendation that the Legislature be permitted "[t]o
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States." U.S. CONST. art.
1, § 8, cl. 3. See generally 2 REcORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 308 (Max
Fan-and ed., 1966).
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